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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

AMENDED APPEAL BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

Case No. 940426CA

TONYA VIGIL,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from convictions of theft by deception, both
second degree felonies.

Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-3(2)(f), provides

this Court ! s jurisdiction over this case.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court conduct an inadequate voir dire?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
This Court reviews a trial court's performance of jury
voir dire for
201, 205

abuse of discretion.

(Utah App. 1992) .

State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d

"Whether a trial court abused its

discretion in conducting voir dire depends on whether, 'considering

the totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate
opportunity

to acquire

the information necessary

[prospective jurors.]1"

Id.

to evaluate

(citation omitted; brackets by the

Court) .
The issue was preserved by trial counsels1 pre-submitted
voir dire questions, and objection to the trial court's failures to
ask requested questions.
1.

Did

the

(R.709,710,718, 719, 725) .

trial

court

give

the

jury

an

erroneous

instruction?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The Court
correctness.

reviews

Ontiveros.

this

supra.

as a question
The

court

of

law, for

reviews

"jury

instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case."

id.

(citation omitted).

This issue was preserved by trial counsels' objections.
(R.1164-1171).
3.

Did the trial court err in blocking the presentation of

defense evidence and in denying jury instructions requested by the
defense?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The jury instruction aspect of this issue is reviewed for
correction of error. Ontiveros, supra. As to the evidence aspect
2

of this issue, the record must show a clear abuse of discretion„
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).
The issue was preserved by trial counsels1 objections to
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, and by trial
counsels1 efforts to present the evidence.

(R.1151-1158; 1164-

1171) .
4.

Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to request

proper defense instructions, and/or did the trial court commit
plain error in failing to give these instructions?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Because the trial court was not presented the issue, this
Court must determine whether trial counsel was ineffective as a
matter of law. Salt Lake City v. Grotespas, 874 P.2d 136,138 (Utah
App. 1994).

Review of trial counsels1

performance

is to be

"'highly deferential111 and is to avoid "* distorting effects of
hindsight.1"

Id.

(citations omitted).

In assessing ineffective assistance, this Court should
determine whether the errors below were both obvious and harmful.
State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62
(1989) .

This Court has the discretion to dispense with the

obviousness requirement where the error was harmful in retrospect,
but may not have been readily apparent to the trial court and
counsel.

Id., 773 P.2d at 35 and n.7.
3

See also State v. Verde,

770 P. 2d 116,122

(Utah 1989)

(applying plain error standard to

failure to given jury instructions sua sponte) . The issue was not
raised below.
5.

Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the

statutes governing this case, in concluding that the facts alleged
here could constitute theft by deception?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
"The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error.11

State v.

James, 819 P.2d 781,796 (Utah 1991).
This issue was properly preserved by trial counsels'
motions to quash the bindover orders and motions to dismiss the
case.

(R.19-60; 183-233; 560; 1052-1053).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provision may be determinative in this
appeal:

Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

State

of

Utah

charged

Vigil

(hereinafter

"defendant") with two counts of theft by deception.

Kenneth Brown

represented defendant in trial.

Tonya

(R.13; 175). The case was bound

over to district court, and defendant entered a plea of not guilty
4

to all charges.

(R.17; 181).

Defendant moved to quash the

bindover orders (R.19-69; 183-233; 560), and the trial court denied
the motions.

(R.82; 261; 582).

Defendant moved to sever the two counts in the two district
court cases. The State opposed this motion (R.252-260), and moved
to join both cases against defendant in a trial on similar cases
filed against defendant's husband, Thomas M. Vigil.
251) .

(R.75-81; 245-

The trial court joined all counts and cases against both

these defendants together for one trial.

(R.261, 585-586).

The jury convicted defendant as charged.

(R.393-394; 397).

The trial judge sentenced defendant to serve two concurrent
terms one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison, suspended the
sentence and placed defendant on probation subject to a six-month
jail term.
From this conviction, defendant filed a timely appeal. (R.531
and 476).
After the notice of appeal was filed, a conflict of interest
caused Mr. Brown to withdraw as counsel, and Mary C. Corporon now
represents Tonya Vigil on appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
DEFENSE CASE
Thomas and Tonya Vigil were married and living with five
5

children in their home as of the summer of 1992. Tonya went to her
physician for a tubal ligation and discovered she was pregnant.
Because the Vigils were financially destitute, they decided to give
up the expected child for adoption.

The Vigils made arrangements

to give up the unborn baby for adoption to three separate families,
the Elizondos, the Bushmans, and the Hallidays. During the course
of the transactions, all the prospective adoptive parents gave the
Vigils money for expenses. The Vigils did not give up their child
for adoption

to

the Elizondo

couple because

the Vigils had

disagreements and difficulties with the attorney representing the
Elizondos.

The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to

the Bushman couple because of difficulties with Mr. Bushman, mainly
because Mr. Bushman told them that he had decided not to adopt the
child himself. The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption
to the Hallidays because, after the child was born, they could not
part with her.

The Vigils kept their baby.

They did not inform

any of the couples when she was born, and did not inform any of the
couples that they were receiving expense money from other couples.
(R.1062-1151).
STATE CASE
Bushmans:
Rex Bushman was an adoption attorney whom Tonya Vigil called
to arrange the adoption. When the Vigils met with him in person on
6

February 28, 1993, he drafted and they signed a document indicating
that he would find a family to adopt their baby.

He asked the

Vigils if his own family might adopt their child, and they agreed.
He offered to pay for medical expenses and they agreed. He drafted
and they signed an agreement for the payment of maternity expenses
on March 5, 1995.

The agreement indicated that they would return

the expense money in the event that the adoption did not go
through.

He also drafted and they signed a form purporting to

waive any conflict of interest stemming from his dual roles as
their attorney and an adoptive parent.

(R.754-761).

About March 3, 1993, Mr. Vigil called Mr. Bushman twice,
indicating the Vigils' need for living expenses of approximately
$1,500. Mr. Bushman had agreed to pay $500 in living expenses, and
then agreed in writing to pay them $1,000 after their consent to
the adoption was final.

Mr. Bushman wrote a check for $390 for

their rent, and a check to Mrs. Vigil for $110.

(R.761-766).

Mr. Bushman maintained contact with the Vigils, but had
decided not to adopt the Vigil baby.

Sometime after March 19,

1993, Mrs. Vigil told him the adoption was still on.

He called

again later and found that the telephone had been disconnected, and
he called the police.

The adoption never went through, and the

Vigils never repaid Mr. Bushman the $500.

(R.766-769).

Mr. Bushman testified that he would not have paid the Vigils
7

$500 if he had not intended to obtain the baby.

When asked if he

considered the money a gift or charitable donation, he indicated
that he found that idea "preposterous." He also testified that he
would not have given the Vigils the $500 if he had known that other
people were paying the Vigils in anticipation of adopting the baby.
(R.769).
The Elizandos:
The Elizondos were attempting to adopt a child through an
attorney named John Giffen.

Their legal contacts informed them

that the Vigils had an interest in having them adopt their child,
so Mr. Elizondo called Mrs. Vigil on the telephone in October of
1992, when she was living with her mother. After further telephone
contact with Mrs. Vigil, Mr. Elizondo arranged to pay $500 a month
for her pregnancy expenses through Mr. Giffen1s office.

He paid

$1,200 to get Mrs. Vigil into an apartment in November of 1992, and
paid a total of $4,300.

John Giffen testified the Vigils received

about $5,300. The Elizondos flew to Salt Lake City from their home
in California to visit the Vigils in February.

Mrs. Vigil told

them the baby was due in March, and forms she filled out for Mr.
Giffen specified March 27, 1993 as the due date.

(R. 879-895; 927;

975-976) .
Later in February, Thomas Vigil called Mr. Elizondo and asked
him to change attorneys because Mr. Vigil was not happy with John
8

Gif fen.

The Vigils did not like the way the money was being

managed, and wanted it to come directly to Mr. Vigil.

John Gif fen

confirmed that Mr. Vigil had had disagreements with him because Mr.
Vigil wanted more money and wanted the money sent to him.

There

was also a problem because Mr. Giffen's assistant did not obtain
medication necessary to treat Mrs. Vigil.

(R.889; 905-907/ 914;

918; 954-955; 958; 1010).
Mr. Elizondo maintained contact with the Vigils in March of
1993, until their telephone was disconnected.

He later learned

through Mr. Giffen's assistant that the Vigils had had the baby on
March 18, 1993, and had decided to keep her. (R.895-897, 908).
Mr.

Elizondo

testified

that

he

knew

that

there

was

no

guarantee that the adoption would go through, that he did not
consider the money he paid to be a charitable contribution, that he
would not have paid them had he known that others were paying them
at the same time, and that he never got any money back from the
Vigils.

(R.897-898; 913).

He had a civil lawsuit pending against the Vigils, which was
filed by Paul Halliday, as of the date of trial.

(R.921).

The Hallidays:
Paul and Vicky Halliday were working through an attorney,
Marilyn Fineshriber, to adopt a child.
9

Mrs. Vigil had originally

contacted their attorney about the prospective adoption on March 3
or 4, and the Vigils met with the attorney on March 7 or 8, 1993.
Mrs. Vigil said the prospective due date for the birth of the child
was August 28, 1993. Mr. Halliday made arrangements to pay $900 in
expenses to the Vigils on March 12, 1993, after Mrs. Vigil told the
attorney

on March

7, 1993, that

the Vigils

were

about

to be

evicted, and another $600 on March 25 or 26, 1993, in response to
Mr.

Vigil's

call

to

the attorney

indicating

that

the Vigils'

telephone had been disconnected and that they needed money to pay
their utilities.

The receipts for the checks to the Vigils from

the law firm state that the payments were charitable donations.
Mrs. Vigil told the attorney on March 23, 1993, that the Vigils
were planning to go through with the adoption.
not adopt the Vigil baby.

The Hallidays did

(R.803-810; 821-836; 860; 868).

Mr. Halliday testified that he did not consider the $1,500 a
gift to the Vigils, that he was not repaid by the Vigils, and that
he would not have paid the money had he known that they would not
receive the baby or that other people were also trying to adopt the
baby.

(R.810-811).
Mr. Halliday admitted on cross-examination that his attorney

had informed him that the $1,500 was a charitable contribution, and
that the money did not guarantee the adoption would go through (R.
815) .

He testified that he had a civil suit pending against the
10

Vigils.

(R.818).

Mr. Vigil called the Hallidays' attorney on April 6, 1993, and
told her that they had not intended to defraud anyone, but had
decided to keep the baby, and would pay back the money.

He also

told her that a California couple had just offered to pay their
expenses, and that he had made no commitment to give the child up
for adoption.

(R. 867).

LEGAL ADVICE TO THE VIGILS
Marilyn Fineshriber, the Hallidays1 attorney, testified that
she told the Vigils the money from the Hallidays was a charitable
contribution, and legally could not bind their consent to the
adoption.

(R.848-849; 864).

John Giffen, the attorney representing the Elizondos and the
Vigils, informed all parties that the money from the Elizondos did
not

buy

the

consent

to

charitable contribution.

the

adoption, but was

considered a

He gave the Vigils a form detailing

adoption-related crimes under California law, which indicated that
it is a crime to receive pregnancy expenses with the intent to
withhold consent to the adoption. He testified that in going over
the form he drafted entitled

"Pitfalls of Adoption" regarding

various provisions of California law, he told the Vigils that it
was illegal to accept money from other couples, and explained that
Utah law is similar to California's, and counseled them about the
11

vulnerable emotional state of the prospective adoptive parents.
(R.930-932; 992) .
Mrs. Vigil testified that John Giffen did not go over the
forms with them, or advise them about any legal issues surrounding
adoption, but sent his non-law-trained assistant to bring the
Vigils the forms.

(R.1121-1122).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A new trial is required because the voir dire in the instant
case did not provide trial counsel with adequate information with
which to assess the prospective jurors. The trial court!s failure
to ask the jurors about their fairness and impartiality, about
their independence in deliberations, and about the impact of their
exposure

to

media

reports

concerning

attempted

adoptions,

constituted an abuse of discretion.
The trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction which
purported to carve out a theft by deception exception from the
statute which mandates that all monies given to birth parents by
prospective

adoptive

parents

be

charitable

donations.

The

instruction was inconsistent with Utah statutes and cases, and was
prejudicial to defendant.
The trial court erred in blocking defendant's presentation of
her defense evidence pertinent to her motivation in seeking out
12

successive prospective adoptive couples. The court compounded the
error

by

refusing

her

requested

elucidated her motivation

defense

instructions

which

for seeking out multiple prospective

adoptive couples.
Trial

counsel

and

the

trial

court prejudiced

defendants

defense by failing to give two jury instructions established by
statute, which would have provided defenses to her actions.
The trial court erred in ruling that charitable contributions
by prospective adoptive parents can be the object of theft by
deception

charges.

This

Court

should

resolve

this

issue

by

ordering the case dismissed.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
A.
The

state

THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
TRIAL COURTS MUST CONDUCT ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE.
and

federal

constitutions

require

trial

insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire.
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn.

courts

E.g. State

1-6 (Utah 1988) (citing Article

I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah constitution, and the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution), reversed
on other grounds. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994) . The
Utah Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power to reiterate
to the trial courts that it is their responsibility to insure that
13

voir dire proceedings not only provide adequate information for the
informed exercise of peremptory challenges, but also eliminate bias
and prejudice from criminal trials.
797-798 (Utah 1991).

State v. James, 819 P. 2d 781,

In James, the Court directed trial courts to

go beyond the minimally adequate voir dire required by federal
constitutional
biases.

Id.

standards, to thoroughly detect and probe juror

See also State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-45 (Utah

1988); State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055, 1053-1061 (Utah 1984).
11

[T] he fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel

to ask voir dire questions designed

to discover attitudes

and

biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they 'would
not have supported a challenge for cause.'
for a voir dire
'defense

question

counsel

intelligently. « "

to
State

All that is necessary

to be

appropriate

exercise

peremptory

v.

Worthen,

765

is that

it allow

challenges

P.2d

839,

more

845

(Utah

1988)(citation omitted).
Utah

Code

Ann.

§77-1-6 (1) (f)

codifies

the

right

to

an

impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, 18(e)(14),
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings adequate to
reveal

juror bias.

The

rule provides that a juror should be

removed for cause if voir dire indicates "that a state of mind
exists on the part of the juror with reference to the "cause, or to
either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and
14

without

prejudice

to

the

substantial

rights

of

the

party

challenging[. ] "
Trial courts carry a heavy responsibility in conducting voir
dire in criminal cases. Mu!Min v. Virginia, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 501510 (1991); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-98 (Utah 1991).

B.

THE VOIR DIRE
INADEQUATE.

IN THIS

CASE

WAS

After the initial round of voir dire, the trial court held a
hearing outside the jury's presence, wherein defense counsel asked
the trial court to ask the following pre-submitted questions:
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the
conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the guilt
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found
that a majority of the jurors believed the defendant was
guilty, would you change your verdict only because you
were in the minority?
28. Are there any of you who are not in such a fair
and impartial state of mind that you would not be
satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental state
judge the evidence if you or your loved ones were on
trial here? In other words, would you want someone with
your state of mind sitting as a juror on a case if you
were the defendant?
(R.709).

The trial court declined to ask questions 27 and 28,

because the court was of the opinion that he had already conducted
sufficient voir dire.
Evaluating

the

(R.710).
"totality

of

the

questioning, 5' State

v.

Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516
(Utah 1992), this Court can see that the trial court abused its
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discretion in failing to ask these two questions.

The voir dire

never addressed whether the prospective jurors felt they were
generally fair and impartial, or whether they would maintain their
independence in the deliberation process, or succumb to pressure
from a majority.
Defense counsel also requested pre-submitted question 10,
which stated:
10. Have any of you see [n] any recent television
programs, or received other information, depicting
attempted adoptions? What did you hear?
Counsel for co-defendant Mr. Vigil informed the court that two
television programs concerning attempted or failed adoptions had
aired approximately one month and one week prior to the trial.
(R.710).

He asked the court to inquire about exposure to the

programs, and the court agreed to do so.

(R.709; 710).

Prospective juror Pepper had seen a program during the week prior
to trial.

(R.715).

The trial court asked him no follow up

questions, but he had already been stricken for cause.
Prospective
(R.716).

juror

Jerman

had

seen

a

show

that winter.

When the court asked Jerman if that exposure to that

information would prevent him from being fair and impartial, Mr.
Jerman said that it would not.

(R.716).

Mr. Jerman had already

been stricken for cause.
Prospective juror Wylie had seen a program somewhere within
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six months prior to trial, and had read a magazine article about
the subject.

(R.715).

The colloquy was as follows:

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms. Wylie,
As a result of the documentary or the article in the
magazine, and considering the nature of today's case,
would any of that information interfere with your
responsibility to be fair and impartial?
MS. WYLIE: No, not really.
THE COURT: You are certain you could remain fair and
impartial to both sides of this case?
MS. WYLIE: I think, yes.
THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word "think." Do
you have a hesitation?
MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in that
detail, you know. I think I can listen impartially.
(R.715-716).
Prospective juror Reese said that she had seen a show called
"Attempted Adoption," wherein a "child was up for adoption and then
their minds were changed and the natural parents got the child
back."

(R.717).

She answered "No," when the court asked, "Would

any of that information interfere with your abilities to be fair
and impartial to both sides of this lawsuit?"

(R.717).

At an unrecorded bench conference prior to the parties'
passing of the jurors for cause, defense counsel objected to the
trial court's refusal to further interview jurors Wylie and Reese
in chambers regarding what television programs they had seen and
how they felt about them.

(R.718, 725).

served on the Vigils' jury.

(R.719).

Both Reese and Wylie

(Trial counsel was under no

obligation to remove them in order to preserve this issue.
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It was

sufficient to request additional voir dire, and to obtain a ruling.
State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 204 n.l (Utah App. 1992).

The

trial court opined that the totality of the questions to all
prospective jurors was adequate.

(R.726).

Trial counsel was correct in requesting further voir dire of
the jurors.

In State v. Boyatt. 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App.), cert.

denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (1993), a case wherein the potential jurors
had been victims of crimes similar to those at issue, this Court
stated,

,!

[T]he

trial

court

must

adequately

probe

a

juror's

potential bias when that juror's responses or other facts suggest
a potential bias.

The trial court does not abuse its discretion

when, after sufficient questioning, the suggestion of bias has been
dispelled."

Id. at 552.

This holding applies here, wherein two

of the prospective jurors had heard media reports which may have
biased them, and state they "think" they could be unbiased.
This Court has recognized the need for specific voir dire of
prospective jurors in civil cases who have been exposed to similar
media reports.

In Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1989);

Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P. 2d 96 (Utah App. 1993) ; and Evans v.
Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1991), this Court has explained that, once preliminary questioning
establishes jurors have been exposed to "tort reform propaganda,"
or media focusing on insurance reforms, prejudice is established,
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and the parties are entitled to more specific questioning to
determine if jurors bear latent or deep-rooted biases as a result.
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458-459; Barrett, 868 P.2d at 99-101; Evans, 824
P. 2d at 464-46.

Given the interests at stake in a criminal case,

trial courts should provide at least as much voir dire as they are
required to provide in the civil arena.

See Hafen at 45 8 n.2

(intimating that the scope of voir dire in criminal cases might
need to exceed the scope of civil trial voir dire in order to
safeguard the constitutional rights of criminal defendants).
When the trial court found that two of the prospective jurors
had been exposed to programs focusing on similar cases, which the
jurors remembered, under Hafen Barrett, and Evans, prejudice was
established and the trial court should have asked more specific
questions to determine if the prospective jurors bore latent or
deep-rooted biases regarding the issues in the case.

See id.

The trial court's perfunctory questions to prospective jurors
Reese and Wylie about whether, in light of the media exposure, they
felt that they could be fair and impartial, were inadequate. Juror
Wylie never gave an unequivocal response to the trial court's
question.

Even if she had, the court should have asked more

meaningful questions so that he and counsel could have assessed the
impact of the media on Ms. Wylie and Ms. Reese.
Utah law has long recognized that trial courts may not simply
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accept a juror's assessment of his or her ability to try a case
fairly; where preliminary voir dire raises a question about the
juror's ability to serve, it is incumbent upon the trial court to
ask probing questions to determine if the juror bears latent biases
which would impair the juror's performance.

See State v. Woolley,

810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.) , cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah
1991)(when prospective juror has been a victim of a crime similar
to that at issue, an inference of bias arises, which is not
rebutted by a juror's claim that he can be fair and impartial).
See also State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987); State v.
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25-27 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
878, 884 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah
1981).
As the Court stated in Evans v. Doty, 824 P. 2d 460 (Utah App,
1991), "[I]t is not enough for a trial judge to ask questions
merely to discover a potential juror's overt biases.

The judge

must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear responses to
questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious attitudes.
Without such an opportunity, the prospect of impaneling a fair and
impartial jury is diminished."

JEd. at 462.

Reviewing the totality of the questioning, this Court can see
that trial counsel was not afforded adequate information to assess
the prospective jurors.

Because the trial court thus abused his
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discretion in conducting the voir dire, a new trial is in order.
See State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992) .
In a related decision on appeal, State of Utah v. Thomas N.
Vigil, Case No. 940614-CA in the above Court, filed July 5, 1996,
this Court analyses the same jury voir dire and finds that the
colloquy between

the trial

court and Wylie and Reese

to be

adequate. This Court finds that " . . . the trial court persevered
in its line of questioning to ensure that the two would be fair and
impartial."

With all due respect, defendant here asserts that the

court did not persevere in questioning enough with Ms. Wylie to
determine if she should be stricken for cause.

As noted in the

State v. Vigil, supra, Ms. Wylie, in response to a question about
whether media information would interfere with her responsibility
to be fair and impartial, responded "No, not really."
qualified her answer.

She clearly

When pressed again about her ability to be

impartial, she again qualified her answer by saying "I think, yes."
When pressed yet another third time about her qualified answers,
she said "I think I can listen impartially."

(emphasis added) Ms.

Wylie never once gave an unequivocal answer to an inquiry about
media information and its impact on her fairness and impartiality.
Trial counsel properly preserved this issue by objecting to the
trial judge's refusal to question Wylie further.

This left trial

counsel unable to ask that Ms. Wylie be stricken for cause because
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her answers were equivocal, and left them uncertain how to exercise
their peremptory challenges, because her answers were unclear.
court refused to clarify this.

The

The trial court clearly did abuse

its discretion in refusing to question Ms. Wylie further.

POINT 2.
A.
The

law

substantive

THE
ERRONEOUS
JURY
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
TRIAL COURTS MUST
CORRECTLY.
governing
scope,

jury

INSTRUCTION

INSTRUCT

instructions

correctness

and

JURIES
is

that

clarity

of

"beyond
the

the
jury

instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.

However, said instructions

must not incorrectly or misleadingly state material rules of law."
State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 843
P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).

B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
DEFENDANT'S JURY.

Trial counsel objected to the portion emphasized below in the
trial court's jury instruction 28, (R.1170), which provides:
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 8
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation
may pay maternity expenses, related medical or hospital,
and necessary living expenses of the mother preceding and
during confinement. However, that act of paying is by
law considered an act of charity and may not be made for
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the purpose of inducing the mother, parent or legal
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or
her child is a personal and private act of that person
and may not be bought or bartered for under the law. A
natural parent at any time may choose not to consent to
an adoption.
By so choosing, that person does not
subject himself or herself to criminal responsibility
unless you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt each and every element of the offense of Theft by
Deception, as charged in the Information have been
established. (Emphasis added).
The problem with the emphasized portion of instruction 28 is
that it carves out a theft by deception exception from the statute
which mandates that all monies given by prospective adoptive
parents to birth mothers are charitable contributions, which does
not exist in Utah law.

Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203 states:

Any person, while having custody, care, control, or
possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, or
attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
However, this section does not prohibit any person,
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of the
mother preceding and during confinement as an act of
charity, so long as payment is not made for the purpose
of inducing the mother, parent, or legal guardian to
place the child for adoption, consent to an adoption, or
cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
There can be no theft by deception in the context of an
adoption, because
charitable

any money given to the birth mother

contribution,

as a matter

and

cannot be

consideration for a promised consent to the adoption.

Utah Code
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of

law,

is a

Ann. §76-7-203.
Reliance is an essential element of theft by deception. State
v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982).

Even if the alleged victims

were deceived, there was no theft by deception unless they relied
on the Vigils1

statements in parting with their money.

Id.

Because the birth parents1 consent cannot be bought under Utah Code
Ann. §76-7-203 under any circumstances, the prospective adoptive
parents legally could not rely on the Vigils to consent to the
adoption.
Birth parents cannot deceive, because the object of their
representations,

the baby,

cannot be

sold,

and

thus has no

pecuniary significance. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405(2) ("Theft by
deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary signif icance [. ] lf) .
Any birth parent aware of Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203 would have
a defense to a charge of theft by deception under Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-402(3), which provides, "It is a defense under this part that
the actor: (a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property
or service involved; or (b) Acted in the honest belief that he had
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property or
service as he did[.]"
Under the plain language of Utah law, the conduct of a birth
mother here cannot constitute theft by deception.
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In the event

that the legislature wishes to make conduct similar to that alleged
here a crime, it may do so by adopting a statute which makes it a
crime

to accept

such

charitable

contributions

present intent to complete the adoption.

if

there

is no

In grafting a theft by

deception exception into the charitable donation statute, the trial
court invaded the province of the legislature, and violated the
doctrine

of

Statutory

separation

Construction,

of

powers.
section

See generally
46.03

(citations

Sutherland,
omitted);

Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 (separation of powers
provision).

The trial court has further chilled all good faith

efforts to care for expectant birth mothers and their good faith
efforts to place babies for adoption.
The last sentence of Jury Instruction 28 misstates the law
governing theft by deception, and the court erred in giving it to
the jury.

The instruction is the crux of the State's case, and the

jury's receipt of it was highly prejudicial to defendant.

POINT 3.
A.

DEFENDANT
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
PRESENT HER DEFENSE IN A NEW TRIAL.
TRIAL
COURTS
MUST
ALLOW
THE
PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE.

Every criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to
present a complete defense to criminal charges against her.

See

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1985)("Whether rooted directly in
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the
Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment,
the Constitution guarantees

criminal defendants

opportunity to present a complete defense.1 ...

'a meaningful
We break no new

ground in observing that an essential component of procedural
fairness is an opportunity to be heard.") (citations omitted) . The
Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection.

An essential

aspect of due process guaranteed by Article I, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to submit evidence."
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945).

"[T]he

defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his defense
is a right guaranteed by the due process clause of our State
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7 [. ] " State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34
(Utah 1981) .

Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution

guarantees numerous rights to an accused.

It states:

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. (Emphasis added).

B.

TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON DEFENSE THEORIES.
26

In instructing the jury, trial courts are governed by the
requirement that "the defendant has a right to have his or her
theory

of

the

case

presented

comprehensible manner."

to

the

jury

in

a

clear and

State v. Ontiveros, 835 P. 2d 201, 205

(Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted) .

C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE.

Trial counsel for Mr. Vigil called Roland Oliver to testify
about services offered by adoption agencies.
objection to the relevance of his testimony,

Upon the state's

both defense counsel

argued that the evidence was relevant because, had the Vigils gone
through adoption agencies, rather than through attorneys Bushman
and Giffen, who provided inadequate services, the Vigils would not
have proceeded as they did, in continuing to seek out prospective
adoptive couples, and accepting expense monies from three different
couples.

The trial court sustained the relevance objection, and

also excluded

the evidence under Rule 403, finding that its

admissipn might confuse and mislead the jury.

(R.1151-1158) .

In this ruling, the trial court forbade both defendants from
presenting their defense.
regardless

of

the

The constitutional provisions prevail,

Rules

of

Evidence.

The

United

States

Constitution, Article VI (supremacy clause); Constitution of Utah,
Article

I,

Section

26

(provisions
27

of Utah

Constitution

are

mandatory and prohibitory, unless expressly declared otherwise) .
The trial court's ruling was also erroneous under the Rules of
Evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402, provides for the admission of
11

[a] 11 relevant evidence

. . . except as otherwise provided by the

Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state
of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable
in courts of this state. ..." Relevant evidence is defined by Utah
Rule of Evidence 401, as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."
Defendants'

[emphasis added]

evidence

regarding

how

adoptions

should

be

conducted, in contrast to the performance of attorneys Bushman and
Giffen, goes directly to the absence of the Vigils' intent to
deceive anyone.

By explaining proper adoption procedures through

Mr. Oliver, defendant

sought to demonstrate

that the Vigils'

behavior was caused by the inadequate performance of attorneys
Bushman and Giffen, rather than motivated by any intent to deceive.
The trial court's exclusion order was also based on Utah Rule
of Evidence 403, which provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
28

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Utah law interpreting this rule demonstrates the error of the trial
court's reasoning. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, courts are to
presume that relevant evidence is admissible unless the evidence
has

"an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or

mislead the jury."
1993) .

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah

In the event that the evidence fell within such a class,

the proponent of the evidence would then have the burden to show
the unusual probative value of the evidence.

Id.

The testimony of Mr. Oliver defendants sought to introduce
would not have an unusual propensity to "unfairly prejudice,
inflame or mislead the jury," and its admission should be presumed.
Assuming that the burden were on defendant to demonstrate the
unusual probative value of the evidence, the burden is met.

The

State's proof of deception hinged on the fact that there were
multiple prospective couples involved.

The prosecutor told the

jury that, had there been only one couple who tried to adopt the
Vigil's baby, the State would not have prosecuted the Vigils.
(R.1175; 1308) .

The theory of the defense was that it was the

inadequate performance of attorneys Giffen and Bush, rather than an
intent to deceive, that motivated that Vigils to become involved
with multiple prospective adopting couples.
Evidence was presented

(R.1297-1301).

regarding the inadequate
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services

provided by Giffen and Bushman.

However, the vast majority of

this evidence required legal training to appreciate.

Mr. Giffin

vacillated in his testimony regarding whether he represented the
Vigils or the adoptive couple.
9).

(R.929; 941; Defendant's Exhibit

He was clearly in a conflict of interest.

Mr. Bushman was

initially contacted to find an adoptive family, but he negotiating
to adopt the Vigil baby himself, and then received documents
authorizing him to find another couple to adopt the baby, and in
fact negotiated with another couple to adopt the Vigil baby.
(R.756-762; 772-783; 792).
vague

forms

purporting

Both attorneys had the Vigils sign
to

waive

conflicts

(Defendant's Exhibit 10; State's Exhibit 3).

of

interest.

Mr. Bushman provided

support money for the Vigils out of his attorney trust account, and
drafted an agreement whereby the Vigils would have to return the
funds if they did not consent to the adoption, in clear violation
of the law.

(R.779-780).

Mr. Bushman, who advertised himself as

an adoption attorney, indicated that the idea that the money to the
birth parents was a charitable contribution was "preposterous" thus
showing an utter lack of knowledge of the law.
Giffen acknowledged

(R.769-770).

having had difficulties with

Mr.

the Vigils,

stemming from the way in which he was dispensing the funds, and
because his assistant failed to obtain timely medical care for Mrs.
Vigil.

(R.938-939; 954).
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Had the jurors been allowed to hear about proper adoption
procedures

from Roland Oliver, this would have clarified the

deficiencies in the attorneys' performances, which the jurors may
not have fully appreciated.

The evidence would have supported the

Vigils' defense that their motivation in seeking out successive
couples was a lack of satisfaction with the attorneys, rather than
a desire to deceive.
The trial court's concerns that the evidence might confuse or
mislead the jury underestimate the intelligence of juries and the
importance of giving the jury the information relevant to deciding
the facts.

State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922

(Utah App. 1994),

demonstrates the error in the trial court's analysis. Teuscher was
charged with homicide for the death of a child which occurred while
the child was in Teuscher's day care facility.

At trial, her

attorney sought to exclude evidence of other uncharged instances of
child abuse by Teucher.
Evidence

404(b),

This Court held that under Utah Rule of

proof

of

the

other

crimes

was

entirely

appropriate, inasmuch as the homicide charge to be determined by
the jury required the jury's assessment of intent and absence of
mistake.
In Teuscher, this Court held that the evidence was also
admissible under Rule 403.

While evidence of uncharged crimes is

normally considered to be presumptively prejudicial,
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rstate v.

Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)], this Court found that the
probative
prejudice.

value

of

the

testimony

outweighed

the

danger

of

Teuscher at 928.

The evidence at issue in Teuscher had a far greater danger of
misleading or confusing the jury than did Mr. Oliver's testimony
here.

Unlike the prosecution in Teuscher, the defendant had

constitutional rights to present her defense, so the admission of
this evidence is more strongly required than in Teuscher.
Cross-examination of the state's witnesses was inadequate to
present the defense because Mr. Oliver's testimony went beyond the
possible scope of cross-examination of those witnesses, and because
defendant had the right to call witnesses for her defense.

Cf.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)(conviction reversed for
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in part because counsel
failed to call witnesses to bolster the defendant's testimony).
Because Roland Oliver's testimony was relevant, and because
its probative value exceeded its prejudicial effect, the trial
court should have admitted the evidence.

While cross-examination

of the State's witnesses did present evidence of the attorneys'
shortcomings,

a

lay

jury

likely

would

not

appreciate

the

significance of the evidence centering on legal technicalities,
such as the serious conflicts of interest. Given the

scarcity of

other evidence available to establish the Vigils' defense to the
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intent element of the charges, the trial court's order excluding
Roland Oliver's testimony was prejudicial.
In its opinion in State v. Vigil, supra, this Court contends
that defendant's argument here is " . . . that this evidence would
have shown that, under different circumstances, [defendant] would
not have conducted himself as he did, . . . "

Defendant here

asserts, with all due respect, that this Court has not considered
the full potential impact of Oliver's testimony. Defendant's claim
here is not that, under different circumstances, she would have
acted differently.

Specific intent is an element of the crimes

charged against her. Defendant contends that she did not intent to
deceive anyone, as the State has claimed.

She contends that the

damaging evidence about her working with three prospective adoptive
couples and taking money from all three is, in reality, explainable
as conduct consistent with a different mental state other than the
intent to deceive.

Roland Oliver's testimony would have further

established that she was being dealt with improperly by attorneys
in a conflict of interest, without being correctly advised by an
attorney of her rights and responsibilities in the circumstances.
Because his testimony went to the issue of intent, Oliver should
have been allowed as a witness.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GIVE REQUESTED DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS.
33

Over trial counsels1 objection, the trial court refused to
give the jury requested defense Instructions 8 and 9, which quote
portions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct.

(R.1169).

The requested instructions were as follow:
INSTRUCTION NO. 8

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected;
and
(2)
the
client
consents
after
consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.
(R.295).
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which
the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client[;]
(2) the client is given a reasonable
34

opportunity
to
seek
the
advi[c]e
of
independent counsel in the transaction[;] and
(3) the client consents in writing
thereto.
(R.296).
Defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on her
theory of the defense.

Requested instructions 8 and 9 would have

assisted in elucidating the shortcomings in the performances of the
attorneys, Giffen and Bushman, and thus in explaining why the
Vigils

sought

out

successive

prospective

adoptive

couples.

Particularly in light of the trial court's refusal to allow the
testimony

of

Roland

Oliver

adoptions,

the

absence

pertaining

to

the

of

to

explain

the

attorneys'

acceptable

norms

requested

jury

deficient

performances

in

instructions
was

prejudicial.
Again, in the related appeal, State v. Vigil, supra, the court
finds this analysis unpersuasive. However, in this related appeal,
this Court fails to note that the crux of the entire case was
whether the Vigils intended, at the moment they took the money, not
to go forward with the adoption. Intent is always an element which
must be proved by extrinsic facts, since we can never see inside
the workings of a human mind at a particular moment. The extrinsic
facts

which

were

so

damaging

in

this

case were

defendants

negotiation for adoption with three separate couples (and three
separate attorneys) and her taking money
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from three separate

couples.

Trial counsel properly attempted to explain this to the

jury by showing a benign explanation for this apparently damning
evidence.

Trial counsel attempted to do so by demonstrating that

defendant had counsel in conflict in the adoption case behaving
unethically and/or incompetently.
This is not a situation where defendant attempted to cloud the
issue by placing blame on the attorneys (as this Court seems to say
in State v. Vigil opinion). Rather, this is a case where defendant
attempted to explain that she had a non-culpable mental state, and
that her conduct which tended to indicate an intent to deceive
could otherwise be explained.
The trial court failed to permit her to pursue this theory of
defense by failing to give the two requested jury instructions
quoting Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct.

A jury could not be expected to know, in a vacuum and

without jury instructions, that it is a conflict of interest for an
attorney to represent both sides in an adoption, or that any of the
other conduct of counsel might be improper.

Thus, the jury

instructions were highly important to defendant's theory of the
case, and failure to give these instructions was harmful error.
POINT 4.
A.

THE ABSENCE OF PROPER DEFENSE
INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
THE
TRIAL
COURT
SHOULD
HAVE
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON TWO ASPECTS
OF DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE.
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Since Utah law mandates that monies given to birth mothers by
prospective

adoptive parents are charitable

contributions, and

attorneys Giffen and Fineshriber advised the Vigils that the money
from the prospective adoptive couples was legally considered to be
a

charitable

contribution,

the

Vigils

were

entitled

to

instruction embodying the law in Utah Code Ann, §76-6-402.

an
It

provides:
.... (3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right
to the property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he
had the right to obtain or exercise control
over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over
the property or service honestly believing
that the owner, if present, would have
consented.
While John Giffen testified that he told the Vigils it was
illegal to accept money from more than one couple, this discussion
occurred

in going over a form embodying California Law.

(See

State's Exhibit 10) . Mr. Giffen testified that he told the Vigils
that Utah law was similar to California's.

Defendant denied the

Vigils ever discussed any such legal concept with Mr. Giffen.
The jury also should have been instructed that " [T]heft by
deception does not occur

. . . when there is only falsity as to

matters having no pecuniary significance[.]" Utah Code Ann. §76-6405(2) .
It

was

the

State's

theory
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that

the

Vigils

deceived

the

Bushmans, the Hallidays, and the Elizondos by falsely representing
their intent to give up a baby for adoption.

(R.7-8; 171-172).

For instance, the probable cause statement originally filed in case
number 931901605 provides:

"The Defendants received money from

three different couples for the baby and yet never delivered the
child

to

anyone."

(R. 172).

As

a matter

of

law,

these

representations had no pecuniary significance. Utah Code Ann. §767-203.

B.
While

THIS COURT
ERRORS.
trial

SHOULD

counsel

did

ADDRESS
not

THE

request

these

defense

instructions, this Court should nonetheless address and rectify the
errors, as plain error and due to ineffective

assistance of

counsel.
Under the plain error doctrine, it is appropriate for an
appellate court to address an issue raised for the first time on
appeal if the error should have been obvious to the trial court and
was prejudicial.

State v. Eldredge, 77,3 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert.

denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).

Some errors will be addressed on

appeal even if they should not have been plain to the trial court,
if, in hindsight, the appellate Court recognizes a high level of
prejudice stemming from the error.
The plain error standard

Id., 773 P.2d at 35 and n.8.

is not to be applied
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in an overly

technical fashion; the rule is designed to balance the need for
procedural regularity against the need for fairness.

State v.

Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989).
The two statutes at issue here should have been obvious to the
trial court and trial counsel.

The statute limiting theft by

deception to representations of pecuniary significance is the same
statute which defines theft by deception.

The statute setting

forth the good faith defense to the charges is located under the
same part of the Utah Code. The language of the statutes is plain
and unambiguous, and directly supports the defense that both
attorneys were attempting to assert through motions to quash the
bindovers, to dismiss, and arguments to the jury.
The absence of the defense instructions was prejudicial.
There were no true defense

instructions given.

There is a

substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome, had the proper
instructions been given.

As it was, the jury had before it no

evidence and no instructions (because the trial judge failed to
give both) explaining that defendant's conduct might be interpreted
in view of something other than deceptive intent. Clearly, if the
jury had had any of this theory of the case before it, it could
have found in favor of defendant.
request

these

defense

The failure of counsel to

instructions

prejudicial.
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is,

therefore,

highly

This Court

should,

therefore, address

the absence of

instructions under the plain error doctrine.
868

P.2d

818,

822

(Utah App.) (discussing

the

See State v. Brooks,
common

standard

for

reversal on allegations of plain error and ineffective assistance
of counsel), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a
defendant must show [1] that trial counsel f s performance
was deficient in that it 'fell below an objective
standard or reasonableness,' and [2] that the deficient
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
(at page 822}.

The prejudice prong is established if there is a

"•reasonable probability1

that, but

result would have been different."

for

counsel's

errors,

the

Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874

P.2d 136, 133 (Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted).
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, the record must be sufficient for this Court to
decide the issue, and the defendant must be represented by counsel
different from trial counsel.

Id. at 822 n4.

Just as the need for the defense instructions should have been
obvious to the trial court, the need also should have been obvious
to trial counsel.

The failure to request the instructions cannot

be based upon any conceivable tactical decision, and fell below
objective standards of reasonableness. Given the absence of any
true defense instructions, and given the evidence in this case,
trial counsel's failure to request the instructions was clearly
40

prejudicial.

See State v. Moritzky, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App.

1989)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel,
who requested defense instruction that failed to incorporate recent
statute beneficial to the defense; court found no conceivable
tactical basis for the omission); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874
P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1994) (conviction reversed because trial counsel
failed to request defense instruction authorized by the Code).

POINT 5.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS CANNOT BE THE OBJECT
OF THEFT BY DECEPTION.

Charitable contributions may not be the object of theft by
deception, as a matter of law.
Theft by deception is defined by Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405. By
the plain language of the statute, theft by deception does not
occur when the matters which are the subject of the deception have
no pecuniary significance.

As noted above, under Utah Code Ann.

§76-7-203, consent to adopt can have no pecuniary significance.
An element of the offense of theft by deception is reliance by
the victims.

State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982).

Because

the victims in the context of an adoption cannot rely on the birth
parents to consent to the adoption, as a matter of law, (Utah Code
Ann. §76-7-203) , there is no reliance causing them to part with
their money, and theft by deception cannot occur. Jones.
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The statute characterizing monies from prospective adoptive
parents as charitable

contributions, Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203,

would also provide a basis for the statutory good faith defenses to
theft by deception provided in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(3), cited
above.
Because the facts here cannot constitute the crime of theft by
deception under Utah law, this Court must dismiss this case.

POINT 6.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME AS APPLIED
DEFENDANT IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.

TO

Defendant, pursuant to Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State
Constitution is entitled to due process of law.

Further, pursuant

to the United States Constitution, the defendant is also entitled
to due process of law.
If a law or statutory scheme is so vague that it does not
provide adequate notice to a citizen of prohibited conduct which
may give rise to a criminal prosecution, then the statute is void
for vagueness, in violation of guarantees of due process.

Salt

Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975), cert, den. 425 U.S.
915 (1976) .
In this particular case, defendant is advised by one statute
of the State of Utah that monies given to her as a birth mother in
anticipation of adoption are a charitable contribution, and under
no set of circumstances can bind her to the adoption.
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The logical

extension of this is that no prospective adoptive parent can rely
upon a promise to consent to an adoption.
On the other hand, defendant has been prosecuted for theft by
deception for receiving money under exactly these circumstances.
This whole statutory scheme, as applied to defendant in this case,
is void for vagueness because it does not put a citizen on notice
adequately of potential criminal conduct.
If the legislature wanted to make this clear it could easily
adopt a law similar to the California statute about which defendant
was advised making it illegal to accept money from a prospective
adoptive parent without present intent to consent to the adoption.
The legislature could also make this clear by adopting a law making
it illegal to accept money from more than one set of prospective
adoptive parents at a time.
however.

These laws do not exit in Utah,

Since they do not, defendant has been prosecuted under a

unconstitutionally vague statutory schemes.
It should be noted that the opinion in State v. Vigil, supra,
does not address this issue for vagueness, and is, therefore, not
dispositive.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant requests that this case be dismissed.

In the

alternative, she seeks a new trial, wherein the voir dire is
adequate, the jury is instructed properly, and she is allowed to
present her full defense.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

(j

day of August, 1996.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
*
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Defendant Thomas M. Vigil appeals a jury verdict convicting
him of three counts of theft by deception, one third degree
felony and two second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995). We affirm.
I.

FACTS

Defendant is appealing from a jury verdict; thus we recite
the facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, "but
present conflicting evidence io the extent necessary to clarify
the issues raised on appeal." State v. Winward. 909 P. 2d 909,
910 (Utah App. 1995).
A. The Elizondcs
In early November 1992, John Giffen, an adoption attorney in
St. George, Utah, received a phone call from defendant's wife,
Tonya Vigil, a co-defendant in this case. Tonya informed Giffen
that she was expecting a child March 27, 1993, and that she and

defendant, the child's father, wished to place the baby for
adoption. Giffen explained to Tonya the procedure for a private
adoption and offered to have Saunya Schuchart, his paralegal who
resided in Salt Lake City where the Vigil's were living, meet
with her and show her several "resumes"1 of potential adoptive
families.
Schuchart met with defendant and his wife at a local
restaurant, provided them with the resumes, and explained the
adoption process. The Vigils chose Frank and Stephanie Elizondo,
a California couple, from the resumes as the prospective adoptive
parents. At this meeting, defendant asked Schuchart whether the
Vigils could receive financial assistance for living and medical
expenses during the pregnancy. Schuchart assured him that they
could.
After the Vigils had chosen the Elizondos as the adoptive
parents, Frank Elizondo contacted Tonya by phone. The two
conversed to get acquainted. At this time, Frank agreed to send
Giffen money to assist the Vigils with their living expenses.
Because neither defendant nor Tonya were working, the Elizondos
agreed to pay for their living expenses until defendant found
employment. At that time, the financial assistance would be
reduced by the amount defendant was earning. Giffen would
deposit the money received from Frank into a trust account, which
would then be used to assist the Vigils when needed. Either
defendant or Tonya would call Schuchart and request money; she
would then contact Giffen. Giffen would transfer Frank's money
into a Salt Lake City bank account from which Schuchart could
draw the necessary amount.2 Frank initially forwarded $1200 on
November 5th to help defendant and Tonya get into an apartment.
After the initial meeting, Schuchart again met with the
Vigils when defendant called requesting that she assist them in
locating an apartment. An apartment was found and Schuchart gava*
defendant two checks, presumably to cover rent. However, Tonya
called Schuchart one or two days later and told her defendant had
left and taken the checks without paying for the apartment.
Schuchart stopped payment on the checks.

1. The "resumes" are pictures and biographical sketches of the
couples attempting to adopt a child.
2.

All checks were made payable to Tonya, not defendant.
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Schuchart did not hear from the Vigils for approximately two
and a half weeks. When Tonya finally made contact with
Schuchart, Schuchart again helped the two find an apartment.
Because of the Vigils' poor credit history, the landlord required
Giffen to personally guarantee rent for four months.
Giffen met with the Vigils in either late November or early
December. Along with a medical record release form, Giffen had
the Vigils sign a "Waiver of Consent of Interest." Giffen
explained that because he represents both the Elizondos and the
Vigils, there was a potential conflict of interest and,
therefore, he needed to get their permission to represent: both
parties. Giffen also discussed a document with the Vigils
entitled "The Illegality Pitfalls in Adoptions." The document
informs birth parents what they can and cannot do regarding the
adoption. Giffen advised the Vigils that receiving money from
adoptive parents for pregnancy related expenses did not mean that
consent for the adoption had to be given. Additionally, Giffen
told them it was illegal to take money from an adoptive couple if
they did not intend to go through with the adoption and it was
illegal for the birth parents to take money from more than one
prospective adoptive couple. Although the document covered
California law, Giffen told the Vigils that Utah had the same
type of laws. Both defendant and Tonya signed this document.
In the middle of December, Giffen received a phone call from
defendant, who requested that Giffen pay him the rent for Januaryearly so that he and Tonya could buy "Christmas presents, and
clothes and things." Defendant assured Giffen he would take care
of the January rent himself if Giffen would release the funds.
Based on this conversation, Giffen sent $375 on December 11th and
$125 on December 14th to cover the holiday expenses.
Notwithstanding defendant's premise, the Vigils failed to pay
January's rent, which was ultimately paid a second time by the
Elizondos.
During the middle of February 1993, the Elizondos visited
the Vigils in Salt Lake City. Schuchart picked the Elizondos up
at the airport and dropped them off at the Vigils' apartment.
The four went to lunch and after some sightseeing, Tonya
suggested they visit the hospital maternity ward where she
anticipated the baby would be born. Tonya also gave Stephanie a
baby blanket which a friend had made for Tonya's baby. Defendant
then dropped the Elizondos off at the airport. Both Frank and
Tonya testified the visit went well.

940614-CA
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After this visit, Frank received a phone call from
defendant, who requested that Frank start sending the money
directly to defendant, bypassing Giffen. Defendant also
requested that Frank change attorneys, stating he was not happy
with Giffen because defendant wanted to control the money and
Giffen did not allow it. Frank told defendant he was bound
contractually to Giffen and could not change attorneys.
Subsequent to this conversation, defendant called Frank again and
requested $1500 to buy a car. Frank told defendant that he did
not have that kind of money and, in any event, the money had to
go through Giffen and had to be for pregnancy related items.
Defendant became angry and told Frank not to tell Giffen about
the request.
Toward the end of February, Giffen received another phone
call from defendant. Defendant again requested that the March
rent be sent early and that it be sent directly to defendant, as
opposed to the landlord. Giffen resisted and defendant hung up
on him. Defendant called again the next day, insisting that he
needed the money. Giffen relented and had Schuchart write a
check to Tonya, which was done on February 24th. A few short
weeks after this transaction took place, defendant again called
Giffen stating that he needed money for the March ren:.3 After
Giffen reminded defendant that they had already paid rent for
March, defendant replied that he spent the money on his car.
When Giffen told defendant he did not think they could pay the
rent again, defendant got angry and hung up on Giffen. Giffen
spoke with Frank, who again sent money to cover the rent for
March.
Frank continued to call the Vigils numerous times a week to
check on Tonya's status. Although he was able to talk to Tonya a
few times, the majority of the conversations were with defendant,
who told Frank that Tonya was resting. Toward the middle of
March, Frank began calling almost every day, anxious about the
baby's arrival. Frank had discussed with the Vigils the
arrangements for picking up the baby; when Tonya went into labor,
either she or defendant was to call Frank. As soon as Frank
received word, he and Stephanie would take the next flight into
Salt Lake City and meet the Vigils at the hospital.

3. Giffen also received a phone call from the landlord
complaining that the March rent had not been paid.
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At one point, Frank was unable to reach either defendant or
Tonya for a full day.4 Anticipating that Tonya had gone into
labor, Frank called the hospital, where he talked to defendant.
Defendant assured Frank that Tonya was only there for a routine
check-up. Frank called again the following Monday and spoke to
defendant. Defendant told Frank that Tonya was resting. When
Frank asked defendant when Tonya's next doctor appointment was,
defendant replied that it was Tuesday. Frank phoned again on
Tuesday and defendant stated than the appointment had been moved
to Wednesday. When Frank called on Wednesday, he discovered that
the Vigils' phone had been disconnected.
The last conversation Giffen had with defendant was on or
w
about March 18th. Defendant called Giffen and told him that they
had not paid their utility bills for several months and, as a
result, the utility companies were threatening to turn them off.
Giffen had Schuchart confirm this with the utility companies, and
the Elizondos ultimately paid for the phone and electric bill.
Schuchart issued a check to the Vigils on March 18th for $150 to
cover groceries. On the same day, Schuchart wrote a check to the
phone company, stuck the check in the envelope with the bill,
sealing it. Schuchart also deposited $250 with the landlord on
March 19th for a cleaning fee deposit.
After delivering this money to the Vigils, Schuchart
received a phone call from Frank, who asked that she investigate
why the phone had been disconnected. Schuchart, knowing that she
had just paid the phone bill, wen: ever to the apartment on the
Thursday following Frank's last phone call to the Vigils, where
defendant let her in. After approximately 2 0 minutes, defendant
brought out a newborn baby girl and introduced her as Alexandria.,
Defendant informed Schuchart that he and Tonya had decided to
keep the baby. When Schuchart asked when the baby was born,
defendant said that she was born :wo days ago.s After learning
this, Schuchart informed Frank. The Elizondos had paid

4.

The date and/or the day of the week is unclear.

5.

The baby was born on March 18, 1993.
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approximately $4300 6 toward the Vigils 1 living expenses during
Tonya's pregnancy.
B. The Bushmans
Rex Bushman, an attorney who occasionally assists with
adoptions, received a phone call from Tonya asking if Bushman was
an adoption attorney. Tonya made an appointment with Bushman
and, on February 24, 1993, the Vigils met with him at his office.
The Vigils expressed their desire to find a couple to adopt their
unborn child. Bushman replied that he and his wife would like to
adopt a baby. Although they already had four children, they
wished to have more and were unable to. Both defendant and Tonya
stated they were amenable to this idea. The Vigils did not
inform Bushman that they were receiving money from the Elizondos
or that they had been working with Giffen.
At this initial meeting, Bushman had the Vigils sign an
agreement stating that Bushman would find a suitable family to
adopt the baby.
Additionally, because
the Vigils had said they
were unable to pay for the medical expenses concerning the birth
of the child, Bushman offered to pay the costs associated
therewith.
The three met again on March 5th at Bushman's office. At
this time, two more agreements were entered into. The first
concerned an agreement that if the adoption did not go through,
the Vigils would reimburse Bushman the expenses he had paid them.
The second document was a "Waiver of Conflict of Interest.'1
Perceiving a potential conflict because he was one of the
adopting parents and also the attorney representing the Vigils,
Bushman explained this fact to the Vigils and had them sign the
waiver.
Prior to the March 5th meeting, Bushman received a call frcjm
defendant stating that he and Tonya needed some assistance with
living expenses. Bushman requested that defendant determine how
much he needed and call him back. Defendant did so, informing

6. The Elizondos sent $1200 on November 5th, 1992, approximately
$1000 in December for January's rent, $375 for rent and $50 for
clothes on February 1st, $100 for utilities on February 18th,
$500 for rent and other expenses on February 24th, $500 for rent
and utilities on March 8th, $50 for clothing on or about March
10th, $150 for food and $82.24 for the phone bill on March 18th,
and $250 for the cleaning deposit on March 19th.
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Bushman that they needed $1500 to cover rent, utilities, and
groceries.
When the Vigils met with Bushman on March 5th, he had
prepared another document reflecting the parties1 agreement that
he was giving them $500 for living expenses7 and would give them
a balance of $1000 after the baby was born and the Vigils gave
their consent for the adoption.
Bushman remained in contact with the Vigils after the March
5th meeting, expecting the baby to be born soon. On or after
March 19th, Bushman called the Vigils and spoke with Tonya.
Tonya assured Bushman at this time that the adoption would still
proceed as agreed, never revealing that the baby had been born on
March 18th or that they had decided to keep the baby. When
Bushman tried to contact the Vigils again, he discovered that
their phone had been disconnected.
C. The Hallidays
Marilyn Fineshriber, an attorney who has a limited practice
in the adoption area, received a phone call from Tonya on either
March 3rd or 4th of 1993. Tonya asked Fineshriber general
questions regarding the adoption procedure and stated that she
was expecting and was interested in placing her baby for
adoption. Tonya made an appointment with Fineshriber to discuss
the matter further.
The parties met on or about March 7th. They discussed the
type of adoptive family with whom the Vigils were interested in
placing their baby, the financial aid this family may be able to
give the Vigils, and the Vigils' medical background. Fineshriber
was told that the baby was due March 2 8th. Neither defendant nor
Tonya mentioned to Fineshriber that they were receiving money
from two other couples in connection with the baby's adoption.
After the initial meeting, Fineshriber spoke with Paul and
Vicki Halliday concerning their interest in adopting the Vigils'
baby. After the Hallidays expressed a desire to adopt the baby,
Fineshriber informed the Vigils, who agreed to the adoption. The
Hallidays gave the Vigils $900 on March 12th to help them with

7. Bushman gave them two checks; one for $3 90 for rent and
another for $110 for utilities and/or groceries. This was the
third check the Vigils received for their March rent.
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living expenses8 and agreed to pay them $600 in April after the
baby was born. Both defendant and Tonya picked up the check at
Fineshriber's office.
After March 12th, Fineshriber spoke on the phone with both
defendant and Tonya several times concerning how Tonya was
feeling, her due date, and doctor visits. Fineshriber spoke with
Tonya on March 23rd, and at this point Tonya did not inform
Fineshriber that the baby had been born, but said only that the
adoption would go forward as scheduled.
On March 25th, defendant contacted Fineshriber and told her
that they needed more money because the phone had been
disconnected and they were behind in paying their other
utilities. Fineshriber asked defendant if they still planned to
proceed with the adoption because that was the only way the money
would be available. Defendant assured her that they were, but
did not mention that the baby had been born. Fineshriber spoke
with the Hallidays, who agreed to give the Vigils an additional$600. Defendant picked up this check on March 26th.
After defendant picked up the check on March 2 6th,
Fineshriber attempted to contact the Vigils, but was unable to
because their phone had been disconnected. Fineshriber did not
speak with the Vigils again until the end of March or first of
April, when defendant called and told Fineshriber that they had
decided not to go through with the adoption but that they had not
intended to deceive anyone. At this time, defendant told
Fineshriber that they had been receiving money from the
Elizondos.
In August 1993, defendant was charged by information on
three counts of theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995). A trial was held in April 1994.
Tonya testified to the events surrounding the adoption.
Although she was satisfied with the Elizondos as prospective
parents, Tonya testified that she became dissatisfied with Giffen
and Schuchart. Tonya stated that she wanted the Elizondos to
have the baby, but because they could not switch attorneys, she
decided she could not go through with the adoption. This
decision was made shortly after the Elizondos visited Salt Lake
City. Tonya did not inform the Elizondos, Giffen, or Schuchart

8. The Vigils had told Fineshriber that because they were unable
to afford their March rent, they were about to be evicted.
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of this decision. Furthermore, even though she had decided not
to go through with the adoption with the Elizondos, Tonya
testified that they continued to solicit funds from them.
Tonya stated that after she decided she was not going to
continue the adoptive relationship with the Elizondos, she looked
in the yellow pages for another adoption attorney. Although she
agreed with Bushman's testimony that they had agreed to let
Bushman adopt their baby, she stated that he later changed his
mind and said he would find a family after the baby was born.
Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Tonya went looking for
another attorney.9
Tonya then spoke with Fineshriber regarding the possible
adoption and ultimately agreed to have the Hallidays adopt the
baby. Although Tonya testified that she was prepared to let the
Hallidays adopt the baby, after the baby was born on March 18th,
she decided she could not give the baby up for adoption. Tonya
stated that she did not talk to any of the adoptive parents or
attorneys after the baby was born and did not call any of them to
inform them of the birth. When asked why she did net return the
money received from Fineshriber after the baby was born, Tonya
replied, "I dicta11 have a phone and I just had a baby and I just
know I didn't."
The jury convicted defendant on all three counts.
aooeals.
II.

Defendant

ISSUES

Defendant raises numerous issues on appeal: whether (1)
the trial court erred by concluding that theft by deception
occurs in an adoption context; (2) the trial court adequately
conducted voir dire; (3) the trial court erred by excluding
defendant's evidence; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to
give two of defendant's proposed instructions to the jury; and
(5) defendant's trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
request a jury instruction regarding possible statutory defenses
to theft by deception or, if we determine that defendant's trial
counsel was not ineffective, whether the trial court committed
plain error by not submitting the instructions to the jury sua

9. However, Tonya testified that she did not learn of Bushman's
change of heart until their second meeting, which was March 5th.
Tonya called Fineshriber on either March 3rd or 4th.
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sponte. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence.

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Theft By Deception in the Adoption Context
We begin our analysis by addressing defendant's claim on
appeal that theft by deception, as codified at Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-405 (1995) , cannot, as a matter of law, occur in adoption
proceedings. Because theft by deception cannot occur in an
adoption setting, defendant argues, the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury on that issue. Whether the trial court
properly determined and instructed the jury that theft by
deception can occur in adoption settings are questions of law,
which we review for correctness, giving the trial court no
particular deference. State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205
(Utah App. 1992) .
Defendant's argument is premised on the juxtaposition of the
statutory language for theft by deception and payment of adoption
expenses. Theft by deception is statutorily defined as follows:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur,
however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995) .I0
Section 76-7-203, which forbids the sale of children but
permits the payment of pregnancy-related expenses, provides:
Any person, while having custody, care,
control, or possession of any child, who
sells, or disposes of, or attempts to sell or
dispose of, any child for and in

10. The jury instructions numbered 20, 22, and 24 set out the
elements of theft by deception. The statutory definition of
deception was set out in instruction number 26.
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consideration of the payment of money or
other thing of value is guilty of a felony of
the third degree. However, this section does
not prohibit any person, agency, or corporation from paying the actual and
reasonable legal expenses, maternity
expenses, related medical or hospital, and
necessary living expenses of the mother
preceding and during confinement as an act of
charity, so long as payment is not made for
the purpose of inducing the mother, parent,
or legal guardian to place the child for
adoption, consent to an adoption, or
cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
Id. § 76-7-203

(1995).

Defendant first argues that because the money given to the
birth parents is considered a charitable contribution pursuant to
section 76-7-203, and not consideration for the birth parents'
promise to place the child for adoption, there can be no
reliance, an essential element of theft by deception, by the
prospective adoptive parents which would induce them to part with
their money. Secondly, according to defendant, as a matter of
law fl[t]he birth parents cannot purvey any deception, because the
object of their representations, the baby, cannot be sold, and
thus has no pecuniary significance." Furthermore, since the
funds given the birth parents are charitable contributions, they
similarly have no pecuniary significance. We find defendant's
arguments unpersuasive.
The statutory definition of deception is found at section
76-6-401(5) of the Utah Code which, in pertinent part, provides,
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person
intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or
conduct an impression of . . . fact that is
false and that the actor does not believe to
be true and that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction; or

(e) Promises performance that is likely
to affect the judgment of another in the
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transaction, which performance the actor does
not intend to perform or knows will not be
performed; provided however, that failure to
perform the promise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof that the actor did not
intend to perform or knew the promise would
not be performed.
I&u

§ 76-6-401(5) (1995).

This court has previously enumerated three separate
components of the deception element:
(1) that defendant's acts satisfied the
statutory definition of deception, (2) that
the deception occurred contemporaneously with
the transaction in question, and (3) that the
victim relied upon the deception, at least to
some extent, in parting with property.
State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685 (UtahApp.), cert, denied.
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) .
Defendant is correct in stating that prospective adoptive
couples cannot be guaranteed that the birth parents will give up
the baby for adoption when they agree to pay for expenses,
because any funds given to the birth parents cannot be used to
induce them into consenting to the adoption, but can only, by
law, be considered a charitable contribution. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-7-203 (1995); cf. State v. Lakev, 659 ?.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah
1983) ("an unfulfilled promise of future performance will not
suffice as a false representation of fact"). However,
defendant's claim that adoptive parents cannot rely on the birth
parents' present intent to place the baby for adoption, even
though legally revocable in the future, is misplaced.11 To the
contrary, "'[t]he [statement of future conduct] is regarded as a
representation of a present intention to perform. Hence, such a
[statement] , made by one not intending to perform operates as a
misrepresentation--a misrepresentation of the speaker's state of
11. Defendant's claim is also contradictory to the position he
took at trial. Defendant proposed an instruction which
essentially stated that accepting money from prospective adoptive
parents does not "subject [defendant] to criminal responsibility
unless . . . fdefendantl never had the intention of consenting to
the adoption of the child."
(Emphasis added.)
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mind, at the time, and is actionable as a misrepresentation of
"fact." 1 " Conder v. A.L. Williams ^Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 640
(Utah App. 1987) (citation omitted); 12 see also, Lakeyf 659 P.2d
at 1064 (staring section 76-6-401(5) "specifies circumstances in
which a prcr.ise of future performance can be an element of the
crime" of theft by deception). Thus, the adoptive parents are
entitled to rely on the birth parents' representations of their
present intent to place the baby for adoption, even though this
decision is revocable. If, at the time they obtained funds from
the prospective adoptive parents, the birth parents did not
intend to place the baby for adoption, they fall within the
definition cf deception, because the promised performance--to
give the baby up for adoption--which the birth parents knew to be
false at the time they made the promise, a'ffected the judgment of
the adoptive parents when they decided to pay expenses to the
birth parents. Quite clearly, prospective adoptive parents would
not part with their money knowing that, at the time the money is
paid, the birth parents do not intend to give the baby up for
adoption.
Defendant also claims that because the child is the object
of his alleged misrepresentations, and by law a baby cannot be
sold, any funds given to the birth parents are considered
charitable contributions. Therefore, defendant asserts the
representations have no pecuniary significance, see Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995), and defendant cannot be found guilty of
theft by deception as a matter of law. Defendant's argument is
meritless. Although the child is the "bait" used, the false
representations of the birth parents regarding their present
intent to place the child for adoption have substantial pecuniary
significance: the resulting financial support from the
prospective adoptive parents, whether characterized as a
charitable contribution or not.
Finally, it is important to note that section 76-7-203
prohibits the payment of money to induce the "mother, parent, or
leaal guardian to place the child for adoption." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-7-203 (1995) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no conflict
between sections 76-7-203 and 76-6-405 where, as here, the
inducement was the false representation made by the "parents" SLQ.
the prospective adoptive parents. Thus, the outcome defendant
urges, to allow birth parents to collect money from unsuspecting
potential adoptive parents based en their false representations,

12. Although Conder was a civil fraud case, we find the analysis
to be persuasive in the criminal theft by deception context.
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is absurd. 3irth parents would be legally allowed to falsely
induce persons who are trying to adopt into paying their medical
expenses, living expenses, and maternity expenses. This is
certainly not the result contemplated by section 76-7-203.
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in
concluding that theft by deception can occur in an adoption
setting and, therefore, properly instructed the jury on this
issue,
B. Voir Dire
Defendant challenges two aspects of the trial court's voir
di're. Defendant first claims the trial court erred in refusing
to ask two questions proposed by defendant. Secondly, defendant
claims the trial court committed error in refusing to conduct
further voir dire of two potential jurors when they acknowledged
exposure to media regarding failed adoptions.
We review defendant's challenge to the trial court's voir
dire for an abuse of discretion. Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d
96, 98 (Utah App. 1993) . Although the trial court is afforded
broad discretion during voir dire, the "'discretion must be
exercised in favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice
in prospective jurors.*" Id. (quoting State v. Kail, 797 P.2d
470, 472 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)).
We will not disturb "a trial court's discretionary rejection of
voir dire questions" unless the trial court abused its discretion
and the abuse "'rose to the level of reversible error.'" Id.
(quoting Hall, 797 P. 2d at 472) . Reversible error occurs when,
after reviewing the totality of the questioning, we conclude that
trial counsel was not given "'"an adequate opportunity to gain
the information necessary to evaluate jurors."'" Id. (quoting
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied,
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439-**
448 (Utah 1988))). There are two purposes behind voir dire. The
process first allows trial counsel to discover any biases an
individual juror may have which would support a challenge for
cause. Evans, 824 P.2d at 462. Voir dire also allows counsel to
gather sufficient information to allow them to intelligently
exercise a peremptory challenge. Id.
After the trial court had completed the first round of voir
dire, counsel was given the opportunity to state their objections
and request further questions. Defendant requested that the
trial court ask his proposed questions numbered twenty-seven and
twenty-eight. Question twenty-seven stated:
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If, after hearing the evidence you came
to the conclusion that the prosecution had
not proven the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, and you found that a
majority of the jurors believed the defendant
was guilty, would you change your verdict
only because you were in the minority?
Question twenty-eight stated:
Are there any of you who are not in such
a fair and impartial state of mind that you
would not be satisfied to have a juror
possessing your mental state judge the
evidence if you or your loved ones were on
trial here? In other words, would you want
someone with your state of mind sitting as a
juror on a case if you were the defendant?
The trial court refused to ask the proposed questions, stating
"the Court is satisfied that it has covered that matter in
substance and the questions have been put to the panel."
Defendant claims that, considering the " ftotality of the
questioning, ' . . . this Court can see that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to ask these two questions,
because voir dire never addressed whether the prospective jurors
felt that they were generally fair and impartial, and whether
they would maintain their independence in the deliberation
process, or succumb to pressure from a majority." However,
defendant has not claimed the trial court's refusal to ask
questions twenty-seven and twenty-eight denied him "'an adequate
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate [the]
jurors, ,n Barrett, 868 P. 2d at 98 (citation emitted), or
prevented him from either exercising a peremptory challenge or
discerning any bias on behalf of a potential juror supporting a
for-cause challenge. See Evans, 824 P. 2d at 462. Defendant
merely asserts the trial court abused its discretion by not
putting the question to the prospective jurors. Without any
analysis on the issue, we fail to see the basis of defendant's
contention.13 It is well settled that an apellate court is not
13. In his reply brief, defendant argues the legal authority
cited in the introductory section to his voir dire argument
fulfilled his briefing obligation. However, citing cases
regarding the general law of voir dire does not form the basis of
(continued...)
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"*a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden
of argument and research.1" State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450
(Utah 1988) (citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9)
("[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented") (emphasis
added). Thus, even if defendant's argument had merit, because
defendant did not clearly analyze the issue, we decline to
address it on appeal.
Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion
when it failed to further question two jurors who said they had
been exposed to media coverage in response to the following
question: "Have any of you see[n] any recent television
programs, or received other information, depicting attempted
adoptions? What did you hear?" After the question was posed to
the potential jurors, several raised their hands. Two potential
jurors, Wylie and Reese, answered "yes" to the question and
ultimately served on the jury.
The colloquy between Wylie and the trial court was as
follows:
The Court:
was it?

. . . And Ms. Wylie, what program

Ms. Wylie: I don't know.
documentary.
The Court:

Just a

How long ago was that?

Ms. Wylie: Within six months and then in the
Ladies Home Journal I think there was an
article too.
The Court: Do you recall the subject matter
of the documentary or the article in the
Ladies Home Journal?
Ms. Wylie: I just knew its adoption and then
they changed their mind.
(...continued)
a legal argument sufficient to put this court on notice of the
grounds of a party's complaint. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9)
(M[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented") (emphasis
added).
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The Court: Was that the subject matter of
those issues?
Ms. Wylie:

Uli-huh.

The Court: Let me ask you this question, Ms,
Wylie. As a result of the documentary or the
article in the magazine, and considering the
nature of today's case, would any of that
information interfere with your
responsibility to be fair and impartial?
Ms. Wylie:

No, not really.

The Court: You are certain you could remain
fair and impartial to both sides of this
story?
Ms. Wylie:

I think, yes.

The Court: Obviously, you use the word
"think." Do you have a hesitation?
Ms. Wylie: I don't remember the story in
that detail, you know. I think I can listen
impartially.
The following dialogue occurred between the trial court and
Reese:
Ms. Reese: . . . I watched a television
program documentary within the last three
months "Attempted .Adoption."
The Court: Do you remember the thrust or
major points of the program you saw?
Ms. Reese: The major thing was that the
child was up for adoption and then their
minds were changed and the natural parents
got the child back.
The Court: Would any of that information
interfere with your abilities to be fair and
impartial to both sides of this lawsuit, Ms.
Reese?
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Ms. Reese:

No.

Defendant's counsel objected to the trial court's refusal to
question jurors Reese and Wylie further, stating, "I felt that we
needed to question them further regarding what the program was
they saw and how they felt about it." The court, however, was
"of the opinion that the totality of the questions put to all of
the panel members, as well as those two panel members in
particular, was appropriate and sufficient." We agree.
Not only was the basis of defendant's objection covered in
the colloquy between the court and Reese and Wylie, but the trial
court persevered in its line of questioning to ensure that the
two would be fair and impartial. This taken together with other
voir dire questions14 asked of the potential jurors gave
defendant " '"an adequate opportunity to gain the information
necessary to evaluate jurors."1'1 Barrett. 8S8 P. 2d at 98
(citations omitted). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to further question these two jurors.
C.

Defense Witness

Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding the testimony of his defense witness, Roland Oliver.
Oliver's testimony was relevant, defendant argues, because it
would have shown that Giffen and Bushman provided incompetent
adoption services to defendant and his wife and, therefore,
caused defendant's behavior. The trial court excluded Oliver's
evidence as irrelevant under Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and, in the alternative, as having the tendency to
mislead and/or confuse the jury under Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.15
Rule 402 provides that "[a]11 relevant evidence is
admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of

14. Other voir dire questions posed to the potential jurors
included whether they had been victims of theft related crimes or
whether they had any experience with adoption proceedings.
15. While defendant attempts to advance a constitutional
argument regarding the exclusion of Oliver's testimony, he did
not do so before the trial court. "Accordingly, we limit our
analysis to the Utah Rules of Evidence implicated by
[defendant's] arguments to the trial court." Statp v. Harrison,
805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App. ) , cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991) .
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Evidence provides: "'Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Svid. 401.
A trial court is accorded broad discretion in determining
whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will disturb that
determination only if the trial court has abused that discretion.
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
We agree with the trial court that Oliver f s testimony was
irrelevant to the issues before the court. Defendant's trial
counsel advised the court that Oliver would have testified
that adoption agencies, because they are
certified by the state and required to do
these things, perform certain services to
adopting parents and to mothers who wish to
place their children for adoption. We feel
that had some of these procedures existed in
this case, that the problems that occurred
here would not have happened.
Defendant's argument that this evidence would have shown
that, under different circumstances, he would not have conducted
himself as he did, is without merit. What is relevant to the
issues at hand is whether defendant, under the facts of the case,
intended to obtain the three couples' money by falsely claiming
that he intended to give his unborn child up for adoption. It is
wholly irrelevant what defendant "may" have dene under different
circumstances and, as the State correctly points out, purely
speculative. This is especially true given the fact that
adoptions through a state licensed adoption agency have an
entirely different set of procedures in place than those done
through a private attorney. While the procedures Oliver was
prepared to testify to may well be "proper adoption procedures"
through a state licensed agency, this is not relevant to whether
the procedures followed by Giffen or Bushman in the private
adoption arena were proper or defendant's intent at the time he
obtained money from the victims. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that Oliver's
testimony was irrelevant under Rule 402.
Even if we were to conclude that Oliver's testimony was
relevant and therefore admissible under Rule 402, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony under
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Rule 403. Rule 403 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]lthough
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. "If the
evidence has an unusually strong propensity to . . . mislead a
jury, we require a showing of unusual probative value before it
is admissible under rule 403." State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182,
1191 (Utah 1995). "The trial court has 'considerable freedom
. . . to make [Rule 403] decisions which appellate judges might
not make themselves ab initio but will net reverse. 1 " State v.
Blubauch, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913
P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937-38
(Utah 1994)). This court will not reverse a trial court's Rule
4ff3" determination absent an abuse of discretion. Trover, 910
P.2d at 1191; Blubauch, 904 P.2d at 699. A trial court abuses
its discretion if its Rule 403 ruling is "'beyond the limits of
reasonability.'" Trover, 910 P.2d at 1191 (quoting State v.
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993)); accord Blubauah. 904 P.2d
at 699.
Here the proposed testimony clearly had a strong propensity
to confuse and/or mislead the jury. Emphasizing what defendant
characterizes as misdoings by the attorneys based on wholly
dissimilar procedures in a state licensed adoption agency only
clouds the real issue before the court--defendant f s intent to
obtain the victims' money by deception. Additionally, defendant
has failed to show this court that dissimilar procedures between
a state licensed adoption agency and a private adoption attorney
have an unusual probative value, thereby outweighing the strong
propensity of the evidence to confuse or mislead the jury. Thus,
the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence under Rule 403
was not "'beyond the limits of reasonability,'" see Troyer, 910
P. 2d at 1191 (citation omitted), and we affirm it on appeal.
D.

Failure to Give Requested Instructions

Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to
submit to the jury two instructions proposed by defense counsel.
We review the trial court's failure to give requested jury
instructions for correctness, granting the trial court no
particular deference in its determination. Ong Int'1 U.S.A. Inc.
v. 11th Ave. Corp. , 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); Ar.cterson v Sharp, 899 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 910 P.2d
426 (Utah 1995).
Defendant submitted proposed instructions numbered eight and
nine which quote portions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules
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of Professional Conduct. On appeal and in support of his claim
that the trial court erred in refusing to give the proposed jury
instructions, defendant merely states that these instructions
"would have assisted defense counsel in elucidating the
shortcomings in the performance of the attorneys Giffen and
Bushman, and thus in explaining why the Vigils sought out
successive prospective adoptive couples.11 There is no further
analysis, insufficient citation to legal authorities, and no
citation to the record upon which defendant relies. It is well
established that this court will decline to consider an argument
that a party has failed to adequately brief. See State v. Price.
909 P.2d 256, 2S3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909
(Utah 1996). 3ecause of the inadequate analysis, we decline to
address defendant's claim on appeal.
E.

Failure to Request/Give Statutory Defense Instructions

Notwithstanding the competence of trial counsel and the
trial court's alleged errors with regard to the foregoing issues,
defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because
he failed to request jury instructions setting out the statutory
defenses to theft by deception. Because trial counsel did not
request such instructions, defendant asserts his trial counsel
was ineffective and/or the trial court committed plain error.
Section 76-6-402 of the Utah Code provides three defenses to
theft by deception:
(3) It is a defense under this part that the
actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right
to the property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he
had the right to obtain or exercise control
over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over
the property or service honestly believing
that the owner, if present, would have
consented.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402

(1995) .

Section 76-6-405 provides:
(2) Theft by deception does not occur,
however, when there is only falsity as to
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matters having no pecuniary significance
IflL. § 76-6-405(2) .
It is well established that in order to succeed on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
a defendant must show (1) that counsel's
performance was so deficient as to fall below
an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) that but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been
different.
State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995).
determines that "it is easier to dispose of the
second element enumerated above, then we may do
reaching the first element. Price, 909 F.2d at

If this court
issue on" the
so without
264.

Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails
because he made no attempt to show uhis court how the outcome of
the trial would have been different had the instructions beensubmitted to the jury. Defendant simply states, "Given the
absence of any true defense instructions, and given the evidence
in this case, trial counsel's failure to request the instructions
was also prejudicial." This is insufficient to show that had
trial counsel submitted the instructions, the outcome of
defendant's trial would have been different and does not merit a
reversal of defendant's conviction. See Stare v. Archuleta. 747
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987) (defendant's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim failed based on defendant's failure to show
prejudice).
Alternatively, defendant argues that even if failure to
request the instructions did not: amount to ineffective assistance
of counsel, it was plain error for the trial court not to have
submitted the above defenses to the jury. In order to
demonstrate plain error, defendant must shew (1) error, (2) that
the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3)
that the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, S50 P.2d 1201, 1208
(Utah 1993); State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996).
Defendant argues that because the statutory language in
sections 76-6-402 and 76-6-405 is clear and unambiguous it was
error to fail to instruct on the defenses and that error "should
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have been plain to the trial court." Even if we assume it was
error to fail to provide the jury the statutory defenses to theft
by deception, this failure was far from obvious, defendant's
trial counsel pursued a consistent defense theory throughout the
trial proceedings, namely, that defendant's conduct was based on
the attorneys' misdeeds.:s Indeed, during an argument to the
trial court, defense counsel stated, "What we will argue to the
jury is that there was no deliberate attempt to defraud anyone
and that Tthel misunderstandings occurred as a result of conduct
of the attorneys." (Emphasis added.) Additionally, during
closing arguments, defendant's counsel argued that defendant
"d[id] not obtain or exercise control over the money. No checks
were ever written to Thomas Vigil. He is neither the object nor
tKe reason for the money being given." Whether defendant was
claiming that he had an "honest claim of right" to the money
contradicts defendant's trial counsel's argument that he had no
control over the money and may or may not be inconsistent with
attorney misconduct. Thus, because defendant's defense at trial
was not apparently based on the statutory defenses, we conclude
no error existed which would have been plain to the trial court.
Cf. State v. Bishop, 753 ?.2d 439, 489 "[Utah 1988; (where
instruction was inconsistent with defendant's theory of case, no
error in refusing instruction); State v. Pendergrass, 803 P. 2d
1261, 1264-65 (Utah App. 1990) (no error when trial court refused
to submit requested instruction which was inconsistent with
defendant's theory of defense).

IV.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the trial court correctly concluded theft by
deception can occur in an adoption setting and, therefore, it
properly instructed the jury en this issue. Because defendant
failed to adequately brief his argument regarding the propriety
of the trial court's refusal to ask potential jurors two
questions submitted by defendant, we decline to address it en -**•
appeal. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to further question two jurors who had been exposed
to media concerning failed adoptions, nor did it abuse its
discretion in excluding Roland Oliver's testimony. We do not
address defendant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing
16. Defendant does not argue the attorneys wrongly informed him
that he had "an honest claim of right to" the money, but that
they instead performed inadequate services which forced him to
look for a new attorney and, he reasons, new prospective adoptive
parents.
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to submit two of his proposed instructions to the jury because
defendant failed to adequately brief the issue on appeal.
Lastly, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails
because defendant has not shown how he was prejudiced by the
omission of the defense instructions. Because trial counsel was
advancing a different theory of defense at trial, the trial court
did not commit plain error by not submitting the statutory
defense instructions sua sponte. Defendant's convictions are
affirr
>L^

Jame^/Z. Davi
Associate Pr

Judge

WE CONCUR:

m
Judith M. Billings, Judge

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge

940614-CA

24

